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11. Introduction
The rotating presidency of the European Union’s (EU) Council of Ministers is a fascinating feature of 
the institutional setting of the decision-making process in the Council. Many accounts of the legislative 
process mention the role of the Presidency and its potential impact on legislative outcomes. Jonas 
Tallberg (2003; 2004; 2006; this volume) has provided us with the most comprehensive account of the 
Presidency so far. He argues that the Presidency has certain powers that allow it to influence the agenda 
and decision outcomes in the Council, subject to some constraints. Firstly, the Presidency enjoys 
procedural powers which allow it to ‘shape’ the agenda. Secondly, the Presidency benefits from an 
informational asymmetry. According to Tallberg, Council members grant these powers to the 
Presidency because it is in their collective interest as part of a grand bargain. My intention in this 
chapter is twofold: Firstly, I want to clarify some theoretical issues related to Tallberg’s account of the 
Presidency’s influence on EU legislative decision-making. Secondly, I want to firmly ground the 
analysis in rational choice theory and provide a detailed analysis of the impact of the Presidency’s 
procedural powers on decision outcomes. Note that I restrict myself to the legislative domain, whereas 
Tallberg covers decision-making in the second and third pillars as well. As will become clear in the 
remainder, there are a number of conceptual issues involved in accurately predicting the power of the 
Presidency. Rational choice institutionalism has been very successful in providing us with crucial 
insights into the workings of politics, not least those of the European Union. It often relies on formal 
models which has the advantage of forcing scholars to be very explicit about how they believe a certain 
process works. By necessity, these models are an abstraction of reality. But this allows us to focus on 
some aspects and study them in detail. However, it is crucial that the reasoning employed does indeed 
capture the essence of the processes at work. Thus, I will argue that the Council Presidency’s 
procedural prerogatives are best modelled as proposal power not agenda-setting power. Agenda-setting 
assumes a monopoly of making proposals which the Council Presidency does not possess. Member 
states are not faced with the stark choice of either agreeing to the Presidency proposal or being left with 
the status quo, but can make their own proposals. As will become clear in the following, this implies 
that the influence of the Presidency on decision outcomes in the Council (and subsequently in the 
legislative proceedings) has been overstated by Tallberg. 
I depart from Tallberg’s theoretical account in two ways. Firstly, I argue that the Council Presidency 
has a monopoly on making proposals as implied by agenda-setting power. Secondly, I argue that the 
powers of the Presidency are not sustained by an implicit deal between successive Presidencies, 
granting extensive powers to each other while they are taking turns at the helm. Instead member states 
acquiesce in the leadership role of the Presidency to reap the benefits of more efficient decision-
making, which implies limited procedural privileges.
2The chapter is structured as follows: In the next section I will argue that member states collectively 
benefit by institutionalizing some form of leadership. This does not entail, however, giving a free rein 
to it. Instead, member states will seek to limit the influence of the leadership on legislative outcomes. 
The third section clarifies the concept of gate-keeping, veto and agenda-setting power in the context of
the Council. I will show that these concepts do not accurately reflect the actual powers of the 
Presidency as set out in the Council’s Rules of Procedure. In section four I will explain the concept of 
proposal power and argue that it is better suited to explain the potential influence of the Presidency on 
decision outcomes. Drawing upon a comparison with the Speaker of the US House of Representatives, I 
will demonstrate in section five why the Presidency can not prevent challenges to its procedural 
privileges by the use of additional powers. 
2. Institutional Design: The deliberate limits of the Presidency’s Powers
In general, political actors confer authority to an individual to secure the benefits they receive through 
better coordination, increased production, and the provision of public goods. Hierarchy can be an 
efficient means to utilize gains of cooperation (Miller 1992: 18). Members of a group grant powers to 
their leaders to realize the benefits of leadership (Calvert 1992; Miller 1992: 25). Thus,
‘leadership is an institutional arrangement created by a P, or a collection of Ps…, in order to 
obtain some objective more efficiently, more effectively, or with higher probability than he, or 
they, could without the coordination and enhanced productivity provided by the leadership 
institution.’ (Fiorina/Shepsle 1989: 20)
Leadership represents a solution to coordination problems and reduces the transaction costs of 
bargaining by providing a focal point and a conduit for group negotiations. Even if all members of a 
group aspire to the same goal (i.e., have the same payoff-structure), the presence of several potential 
outcomes implies that to resolve an issue requires a certain effort of coordination (pure problems of 
coordination, see Calvert (1992: 9 -10)). A leader can offer a short-cut through the potentially 
protracted process of agreeing upon a specific outcome by providing a focal point on which 
expectations can converge (Schelling 1960). If the member of the group value outcomes differently, 
while still benefiting from cooperation (i.e., reaching an agreement), the potential for costly delays 
increases. Thus, the value of an agreement diminishes because members, while negotiating the specific 
decision, forego the opportunity of reaching jointly beneficial agreements in other areas. The time 
spend on hackling over any given dossier could also be used to discuss the next item on the agenda. In 
3addition, the delay induced by the need to accommodate different positions implies that the bargaining 
partners can not enjoy the benefits of the agreement (Binmore, Rubinstein et al. 1986). For example, if 
the member states can not agree on the exact level of subsidies in a given field, there will be none for 
the time being. If the positions of the member states are not commonly known, the risks of costly delays 
and bargaining failure increases even more (Sutton 1986: 720; Farrell 1987). To maximize their 
individual gains, member states will be tempted to misrepresent their preferences, while trying to gain 
insights into the preferences of others, and try to devise and implement commitment strategies to 
advance its bargaining position (Luce and Raiffa 1957: 91-2). In this situation, 
‘[t]he problem of distributing the gains from efficient cooperation will be so daunting that the 
bargainers might lose a large amount of the potential gains that ensues. The specter that is raised 
is one of bargaining failure – the loss of those very efficiency gains that motivate actors to go the 
bargaining table in the first place.’ (Miller 1992: 49)
In sum, bargaining – even under the best of circumstances – is a costly endeavour. Indeed, the 
transaction costs incurred by the resources (e.g. time) spent and opportunities lost in bargaining are 
‘essentially limitless’ (Miller 1992: 47). Thus, group members have strong incentives to reduce these 
transaction costs and limit the potential for bargaining failures by creating leadership. This, invariably, 
includes granting special powers to a member of the group, which can be misused by the leader. As 
Randall Calvert explains:
‘Because the leader produces group benefits that are degraded when leaders are overthrown  or 
weakened, and because the realization of those benefits requires responsiveness on the part of 
followers, the leader does indeed have power.’ (Calvert 1992: 19)
In other words, the power of a leader relies on his ability to create value for the group members. Powers 
are given to a leadership if and insofar as they help the group to achieve goals that they would have 
been unable to achieve without the coordination of leadership and the enhanced efficiency in decision-
making that ensues (Fiorina and Shepsle 1989: 20). 
While it is in the interest of group members to grant power to a leader, it is not in their interest to allow 
the leader to abuse his powers. Thus, group members will strive to limit the powers of the leader as far 
as possible while still creating efficiency gains. The procedural privileges of a leader can be limited by 
not vesting absolute powers into his office and limiting the term of office. 
4This line of reasoning also applies to the Council of Ministers. Member states have an interest in 
enhancing the productivity of the Council without letting a leadership exploit their privileges in terms 
of decision outcomes. 
The Council has to attend a multitude of legislative proposals. Each proposal raises several issues. The 
technical and political complexity of the discussions means that the potential for common gains in a 
given dossier might go unnoticed. In this situation, a central coordination mechanism allows 
negotiations to focus on a set of particular proposals. Synchronizing the attention given to particular 
dossiers by the member states and imposing order on the negotiations allows for a more efficient way of 
conducting legislative decision-making. By creating the office of a Council Presidency and granting it 
the prerogatives of prioritizing items and making compromise proposals, the member state ensured that 
they would get the maximum benefit from negotiations. 
By limiting the powers the Presidency enjoys a member state is barred from becoming a ‘policy 
dictator’ during its term in office. The member states could have created a much more powerful 
Presidency office, e.g. by granting it gate-keeping or agenda-setting power. However, as I will show 
below, to prevent or limit abuse of presidential powers they choose a limited form of proposal power 
rather than granting the Presidency more far-reaching formal powers. Furthermore, they abstained from 
enshrining these powers in the treaties. 
Governments do not have to ‘accept the exploitation of the Presidency office in the present because 
they will get their opportunity in the future’ (Tallberg 2003: 16). The reciprocal acquiescence in the 
unchecked powers of the Presidency is neither necessary nor sustainable. The institutional setting can 
empower the Presidency to search for viable compromise proposals and yet constrain its powers to 
manipulate outcomes. Also, an arrangement where member states hold far-reaching powers during their 
term in office could not be build on a system of reciprocity (or vote trading). Unless the exchange of 
votes (here: the acquiescence in the unchecked powers of the Presidency for a limited period) takes 
place simultaneously, member state governments will be tempted to renege on their promises (Brams 
2003: 199-206). Having exploited all other member states to the fullest degree during their term in 
office, they will be hesitant to allow other member state to exploit them once they are not at the helm 
anymore. Governments are unlikely to be still in power when their member state takes up the 
Presidency again. Hence, they can not be punished by other member states for not following through on
their promise to accept the unchecked rule of other member states’ during their term in office. 
Tallberg (2003: 16-7) quotes a Commission official who argues that the Presidency hands out ‘bitter 
bills’ every day. Ordinary Council members ‘suffer for six years’ because they will look forward to 
their own turn at the helm in the seventh year when they ‘get to bash the others’. However, most 
governments can not count on still being in office in the seventh year. In an enlarged Union, 
5furthermore, the period of ‘suffering’ has nearly doubled. The price to pay for being more than primus 
inter pares for six months increases with the number of member states and the length of the interval 
between holding the Council Presidency. In the club of 27 member states, the policy gains made while 
being in power would have to be worth more than the policy losses sustained during the rule of the 26 
other member states if this grand vote-trading scheme should work.
To ensure efficient negotiations member states will grant the Presidency some procedural prerogatives 
in legislative decision-making. However, to prevent the abuse of these powers by the Presidency 
member states will curtail these powers. The powers of the Presidency rest on the acquiescence of the 
member states and there is a limit to which they will grant them. 
3. Institutional Power and the Council Presidency
Veto and agenda-setting power have become prominent concepts in rational choice to analyze the 
powers an actor can derive from an institutional setting granting him certain privileges. They have been 
widely used to study legislative behaviour (e.g., Tsebelis 2002; Cox 2006). In the following, I will 
demonstrate the effect of granting these powers to an actor and discuss if the Council Presidency indeed 
does hold veto or agenda-setting power. In particular, I will clarify the meaning of the term agenda-
setting which has been used with different meanings in the literature on the Council Presidency.  I will 
argue that the member states did not grant as far-reaching and absolute powers as veto or agenda-setting 
to the Presidency. 
An actor has veto power if her consent is necessary for a shift in policy. If an agreement requires 
unanimity all actors have veto power. Otherwise, the other bargaining parties can overrule an actor who 
does not have veto power. An important distinction concerns ex ante and ex post veto power. Ex ante 
veto power, or gate-keeping power, refers to the ability to prevent any new policy from being agreed 
upon. An agent with gate-keeping power can protect the status quo by not allowing any negotiations on 
policy alternatives. This is a purely negative power, the gate-keeper does not have any privileges once 
the gates are opened. In deciding whether or not he should open the gates, the gate-keeper will compare 
the expected outcome of negotiations to the status quo. He will allow discussions if the expected 
outcome is better to him than the status quo. In a uni-dimensional space and under majority rule, 
Black’s (1998 [1958]) Median Voter Theorem makes this comparison a straightforward exercise. The 
outcome will either the status quo or the median’s ideal point, depending on which one is preferred by 
the gate-keeper (Denzau and Mackay 1983). In a multi-dimensional setting and majority rule, however, 
6only under very rare conditions one outcome can be determined as the outcome of negotiations (Plott 
1967; McKelvey 1976). A gate-keeper might be faced with the dilemma of having to decide on whether 
or not to open the gate without knowing if the outcome of open negotiations will be superior to the 
status quo (Denzau and Mackay 1983; Shepsle and Weingast 1987). Ex post veto power, in contrast, 
allows the actor to choose between the outcome of the negotiations and the status quo directly. This 
ensures that the outcome is either the status quo or a policy that the veto player prefers to the status quo 
(Shepsle and Weingast 1987: 93; Tsebelis 2002: 19-24). Consider, for example, a legislative proposal 
on the European wide adoption of a limit on working time. For ease of exposition, imagine that no 
national regulations on this matter exist at the moment and that the only issue at hand is the limit on 
working hours (where one extreme, infinity, implies no limit). Thus, the status quo, the policy that 
would prevail safe a new decision, would be no limit on working time. An actor with ex ante veto 
power (i.e., gate-keeping power) could prevent any decision on the topic. In other words, a gate-keeper 
effectively chooses between the status quo and the (anticipated) outcome of the discussions. Ex post 
veto power would allow an actor to wait until there is a decision (e.g., a limit of 45 hours) and then 
decide whether or not this is preferable to the status quo (e.g., no limit). This will influence the 
behaviour of the other actors as they would strive to adopt a decision that will not be vetoed. If a limit 
of 45 hours would be vetoed but not a limit of 50 hours, they might adopt the latter rather than being 
stuck with the status quo (no limit) following a veto. 
The term ‘agenda-setting’ is ambiguous in political science as it has been used in two fundamentally 
different meanings. 
Following Romer and Rosenthal (1978) formal theorist have used agenda-setting power in situations 
where an actor has monopoly proposal power (and gate-keeping power)1. Effectively, he can make a 
take-it-or-leave-it proposal as the other voters can only decide between adopting or defeating his 
proposal. The set from which outcomes can be chosen is thus restricted to the status quo and the 
proposal of the agenda setter. Whereas veto power only delimits the set of possible outcomes to the 
ones which are preferred by all veto players to the status quo, agenda-setting power yields a unique 
outcome. 
Kingdon (1995) uses the term agenda-setting in a fundamentally different way. Agendas are defined  by 
him as ‘the list of subjects or problems to which [decision-makers] … are paying some serious attention 
at any given time.’ (3) An agenda-setter changes this agenda ‘as it highlights its conception and its 
proposals, and makes attention to subjects that are not among its high priorities much less likely’ (199). 
1 To make things even more complicated there is a further distinction between agenda-setting as the 
structuring of the overall voting sequence and agenda-setting as making a take-it-or-leave-it proposal. 
However, if actors are sophisticated and anticipate possibly attempts of manipulation by the agenda-setter, 
this distinction practically disappears (Shepsle and Weingast 1984). Moser (2000) offers a good introduction 
to this topic. 
7Thus, an agenda-setter according to Kingdon changes the salience of an issue and not necessarily the 
actual outcome. Furthermore, an agenda-setter contributes to the specification of alternatives, narrowing 
the number of proposals that are seriously considered  (Kingdon 1995-1). Kingdon, therefore, primarily 
refers to the introduction or highlighting of issues and a specification of several policy alternatives, 
whereas formal theorists are concerned with a single proposal within a given policy space.
A one dimensional spatial model will be helpful to convey the difference in the level of power held by 
an actor who has veto or agenda-setting power. In a spatial model, policies are represented by points in 
a policy space with distance denoting the difference between policies2. Political actors have an ideal 
position which is the policy they prefer most. In evaluating policies, actors compare their distance to 
their ideal position. They would prefer a policy close to their ideal position to one further away 
(regardless of the direction). 
---- Figure 1 about here ----
Figure 1 shows a one-dimensional policy space with the ideal points of the median voter (M) and the 
Presidency (P). SQ denotes the location of the status quo, the policy which prevails unless new 
legislation is enacted. The Presidency is indifferent between P’ and SQ as they are equally far away 
from P. Any policy inside the interval from P’ to SQ is closer to the Presidency’s ideal position than the 
status quo. Hence, any point inside this interval would be preferred by the Presidency to the ideal 
position. 
For the sake of simplicity, we will use a scenario in which a decision is made by simple majority in one 
dimension which allows us to invoke the median voter theorem. According to the median voter 
theorem, a decision of a majority in a one dimension when no actor has special powers will reflect the 
preferences of the median voter. Let’s contrast this outcome to a situation where the Council Presidency 
has gate-keeping power. In this case it will compare the eventual decision, that is the median voter’s 
ideal position, to the status quo in order to decide whether or not it should open the gates. In the 
scenario depicted in Figure 1, the status quo is closer to the Presidency’s ideal position than the median 
voter’s position. Hence, the Presidency will use its gate-keeping power and the outcome is the status 
quo. This demonstrates the essentially negative power of gate-keeping. The Presidency can only 
prevent the outcome from being worse than the status quo. Furthermore, the Presidency can not collude 
with the median to choose a policy both would prefer to the status quo. Once the gates are open, gate-
keeping power would not ensure that the median voter would keep his part of the deal. (Ex post) Veto 
power, in contrast, would allow the veto player to choose between a new proposed policy and the status 
2 For a good introduction to spatial models see Hinich and Munger (1997).
8quo. Hence, the outcome would lie in the interval P’ to SQ, everything else would make P worse off 
than the status quo and hence he would exercise his veto power. Agenda-setting power, finally, would 
allow the Presidency to pick a new policy subject to the support of a majority. In the scenario depicted 
in Figure 1, any policy in the interval M’ to SQ would be preferred by the median voter (and hence a 
majority) to the status quo. Thus, there is a set of points (P’ to SQ) that both, median voter and 
Presidency, would prefer to the status quo. Indeed, the Presidency would propose its own ideal position, 
which would be accepted by the median. In general, as this example has shown, institutional powers 
allow an actor to influence policy outcomes in line with its preferences. If and to what degree it is 
possible to shift outcomes towards its own ideal position depend on the configuration of preferences, 
the voting threshold, and the location of the status quo. It has also been demonstrated that different 
institutional powers have a varying effect on the ability of an actor to bias outcomes in line with his 
preferences. Thus, to evaluate how much an actor potentially benefits from being in office depends on 
the exact nature of the powers that an office provides. Furthermore, the effect of these powers varies 
from issue to issue as it depends on the preference configuration.
The Council Presidency holds neither veto nor agenda-setting power in the formal sense. The member 
state holding the Presidency enjoys veto power like any other member state if a decision is made by 
unanimity. But the office of the Presidency does not allow a member state to prevent a proposal from 
being considered nor does it grant a member state a monopoly on making proposals. 
It has been argued that the member states holding the Council Presidency enjoys gate-keeping power 
during its six months in office. In his analysis of the co-decision prodedure,  Crombez (2000: 45 and 
52-3) assumes that the consent of the Council Presidency is necessary before a vote on a proposal can 
be taken in the Council. More generally, Tallberg argues that 
‘the Presidency may exploit its procedural control to exclude items from the decision agenda of 
the Council, whether at working-group, Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), 
or ministerial level.’ (Tallberg 2003: 12, emphasis in original)
Tallberg frames this as one of three form of agenda exclusion which is defined as ‘the active barring of 
an issue from the policy agenda’ (2003: 5).  Besides excluding an item from the agenda, a Council 
Presidency can simply ignore a pressing issue or present only unfeasible proposals (Tallberg 2003: 12-
3). 
The concept of agenda-setting power has been widely used in studies of EU decision-making (Hörl, 
Warntjen et al. 2005). Different models of the legislative process have assigned agenda-setting power to 
various actors. In most cases, this means that legislative bodies are characterized as collective agenda 
9setters. Some models, however, credit individual actors with the de facto power of making ‘take-it-or-
leave-it’ proposals. Steunenberg and Dimitrova argue that within the Council ‘the Presidency selects the 
final policy conditional on the agreement of the other members’ (Steunenberg and Dimitrova 2003: 12). 
Consequently, their models predicts that the Presidency has a significantly larger influence on policy 
outcomes than ordinary Council members (Steunenberg and Dimitrova 2003: Table 1). Tallberg  claims 
that the Council Presidency has both agenda-setting power a la Kingdon and in the rational choice 
tradition. In the vein of Kingdon’s use of the term agenda-setting, Tallberg (2003: 6-8) explains that the 
Presidency can draw attention to a topic, put forward specific proposals, or adopt new institutional 
practices to highlight an issue. Furthermore, he argues that as part of its ‘agenda-structuring’ powers the 
Presidency can decide on what proposals are voted upon in which order (Tallberg 2003: 10). This 
implies agenda-setting power in the tradition of formal theorists. 
The Council Presidency, however, does not have the formal authority to exclude an item from the 
agenda of a meeting, prevent a vote from being taken, or restrict the proposals on which a vote is being 
taken to its own. An item is included on a provisional agenda, which also indicates on which item a 
vote may be taken, if a member states or the Commission request it 16 days prior to a meeting (Art. 3 
clause 3 Council’s Rules of Procedure). The final agenda is decided upon by the Council. A vote is 
initiated by the Presidency or  taken upon the request of a member state or the Commission if it has the 
support of a majority of member states (Article 11 clause 1 Council’s Rules of Procedure). The Council 
Presidency can ask a member state to put an amendment of the text under discussion in writing before a 
given date. It can also ask member states with similar or identical positions to agree on a joint proposal
(Art. 20 clause 1 Council’s Rules of Procedure). Thus, the Council Presidency is not endowed with the 
formal power to exclude items from consideration. Any member state (and the Commission) can 
request an item to be included in the discussion and ask for a vote. In his study of environmental policy 
under four Council Presidencies, Wurzel (2004: 26) concludes that the Presidencies did not refuse to 
take up unwanted dossiers if they had already been debated at the ministerial level. The sole exception 
is the discussion of the end-of-life directive under the German Presidency. If the Council Presidency did 
have agenda-setting power this would be the norm, not the exception. The Presidency would routinely 
keep the gates closed on dossiers it does not like to see adopted. 
The Council Presidency does not have the formal authority to make ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ proposals or 
veto power due to its office. All member states can put forward proposals for discussions and request a 
vote. Furthermore, proposals by Council members other than the Presidency do not have to pass a 
higher voting threshold, making it more difficult for them to set the agenda. Hence, the Council 
Presidency does not enjoy agenda-setting power in the sense used in rational choice theory. It does 
enjoy, however, a prerogative at making proposals. While the Presidency can not prevent other member 
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states from making proposals, it can use its powers over the procedure to make the first proposal. The 
consequences of this are captured best by the concept of proposal power. 
4. The Effect of the Presidency’s Proposal Power
The power to propose refers to the disproportionate payoff the actor making the first proposal can 
achieve even if he does not enjoy gate-keeping power, i.e. the power to keep a proposal off the agenda, 
for the whole bargaining process. This captures the situation of the Council Presidency more accurately 
than veto or agenda-setting power. After the Presidency has made a first ‘compromise’ proposal other 
member states are free to present alternative texts. As explained above, the Council Presidency does not 
have a formal power of either barring items from the decision-making process or limiting votes to its 
own proposal. The Council Presidency, however, does have the prerogative to make the first proposal. 
It can also call immediately call for a vote to be taken. If its proposal does not attract a sufficient 
majority, another member state can request a vote for a different proposal. Arguably, the Presidency 
may delay this by moving to the next item on the schedule. However, the Presidency cannot hold off a 
vote indefinitely as implied by veto and agenda-setting power. Instead, other member states can force a 
vote on an alternative proposal during the term in office of the Presidency. If another proposal is not 
discussed in the same meeting, it can be scheduled in a few weeks time. 
While proposal power still gives the Presidency a procedural advantage with positive distributional 
consequences, these are not as stark as they would if the Presidency would enjoy agenda-setting power. 
The member states deliberately curtailed the powers of the Presidency by granting it proposal but not 
agenda-setting power. 
Baron and Ferejohn (1989; 1989) capture the advantage the first-mover enjoys by recognizing the 
importance of asymmetric probabilities of recognition. The strength of proposal power depends on the 
voting threshold as the first-mover in effect receives the benefits which otherwise would have gone to 
the outvoted members. If actors can not be certain that they will be recognized to make a proposal, the 
first-mover can be beneficial even if amendments (i.e., counter-proposals) are possible (Baron and 
Ferejohn 1989: 363; Baron and Ferejohn 1989: 1197), although the benefits of the first-mover are 
diminished. 
The agenda-setting power discussed so far crucially depends on its inclusion of gate-keeping power: 
proposals are considered under a closed rule, i.e. they cannot be amended, and the agenda-setter has a 
monopoly on making proposals (Baron and Ferejohn 1989: 346-7, 353-4; Moser 2000: 28-32). Baron 
and Ferejohn argue that in a distributive setting the actor who has the right to make the first proposal 
benefits disproportionally even under an open rule where amendments are possible. In their model no 
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actor has a monopoly on making proposals, as an agenda-setter would have. Instead, a proposer is 
recognized randomly to make a proposal to the decision-making body. If this proposal fails to win a 
sufficient majority, another member (also selected randomly) will make a proposal. We can also think 
about intermediate scenarios where the first proposer gets to make proposals for a number (but not all) 
of the voting rounds. The crucial difference to agenda-setting models is the possibility of several 
competing proposals being made during the decision-making process. Agenda-setting power implies 
that all the other actors get to choose between the proposal of the agenda-setter and the status quo, i.e. 
the result of no change in policy. The agenda-setter only has to make a sufficient majority better off 
than the status quo to ensure passage of his proposal. Because there are no alternative proposals on the 
horizon the other actors would have to accept this.  In contrast, with proposal power legislators compare 
the initial proposal to future proposals by other (randomly selected) members. The initial proposal has 
to make them better off than they are by voting against the proposal and continuing the decision-making 
process in which they might be selected to make their own proposal. However, future proposals might 
be even worse than the proposal by the first mover. An agenda-setter derives power from the certainty 
of the other members that the only possibility for policy change lies in the proposal of the agenda-setter. 
The first mover derives proposal power from the uncertainty of other members of whether or not they 
will benefit from future proposals. A simple example might make this difference clearer. Consider a 
council of 7 members who have to decide how to structure a spending programme on regional 
infrastructure. They can spend 70 million Euro in regional infrastructure projects, each worth at least 1 
million Euro. If they cannot reach agreement, there will be no spending programme and hence nobody 
receives extra funding for infrastructure. For the ease of exposition, let us assume that they can only 
consider two proposals (as there is other pressing business to attend to) and 5 votes are needed to reach 
agreement. An agenda-setter has a monopoly on making proposals, hence the situation is the same in 
both rounds with the agenda-setter making a proposal to the other council members. His proposal needs 
to attract four votes (besides his own) to be adopted. Hence, he has to make four council members 
better off than the status quo.  He would do so by proposing the minimum amount of spending for their 
regions (i.e., 1 million) for four council members, keeping the remaining 66 million for his region and 
leaving two council members without any funding. Contrast this to the situation with a random 
selection of the proposer, rather than a monopoly. In the last round, the above scenario prevails. As 
there are no further proposals to be discussed, members have to compare the proposal to the status quo 
(i.e., no extra funding). Whoever is selected to make the proposal reaps 66 million Euro for his 
domestic constituency. The strategic considerations in the first round, however, change drastically if 
there is no monopoly on making proposals by an agenda-setter. All council members (except the current 
proposer) can be randomly selected to make the second proposal. Instead of comparing the offer of the 
first mover to the status quo, council members will consider the possibility of gaining more in the 
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second round. Random selection gives them a 1/6 probability of being recognized in the second round 
and receiving 66 million. The expected value of rejecting the initial proposal and going into the second 
round is the probability of recognition times the value of being recognized, i.e. 11 million Euro in this 
example. The proposal in the first round has to offer four members at least 11 million Euro to get 
passed, otherwise it would be worthwhile for members to gamble on being recognized in the second 
round.  This results in 26 million Euro for the first mover, 44 million to ‘buy out’ enough members to 
form a sufficient majority and again no funding to two outvoted members. The first mover with 
proposal power still fares better than receiving an equal share of 10 million, but not as good as an 
council member with agenda-setting powers. 
In general, a first mover benefits from the number of rounds in which he can make proposals, the 
impatience of other council members, a low voting threshold, and their discontent with the status quo. 
The power of an actor diminishes the more his prerogatives depart from a monopoly of making 
proposals. The more council members value an early decision, the more concessions they would make 
towards the first mover. Also, the more member can be outvoted, the better for the proposer. In the 
example above, five out of seven votes were necessary. The first mover had to ‘buy out’ four other 
council members by including spending in their regions in his proposal. If the decision had been made 
by simply majority, this would have dropped to three other members. Conversely, unanimity rule would 
have guaranteed (ceteris paribus) an equal distribution of the spending. The more voters can be ignored, 
the better for a council member putting together a winning proposal. The last point is more complex. 
The Baron/Ferejohn model was developed for distributive ‘pork barrel’ politics, such as spending 
programmes. Some of its assumption do not hold for the case of regulatory politics. In a distributive 
setting, a proposal can freely hand out specific benefits to other actors. A proposal might give some 
benefits to one group of actors and withhold any benefit from others. In the example above, two council 
members did not receive any spending and the smallest number of council members was included in the 
spending proposal with the minimum amount to get their agreement. In a regulatory setting, a proposer 
is more constrained. Consequently, the effect of proposal power in a regulatory setting is limited 
compared to the distributive context. Firstly, an increase in the value of the status quo decreases 
proposal power (Banks and Duggan 2006: 62). Council members might be quite content with the status 
quo and would need a stronger incentive to agree to a new policy proposal. Secondly, the choice of 
coalition partners is constrained by the distribution of preferences. In the extreme case there might not 
even be a sufficient majority in favour of a change of the status quo. Even if there is, the proposer still 
faces limited options compared to a distributive setting. He can only seek the support of other actors 
with similar preferences. In the case of (qualified) majority rule with weighted votes, this could mean 
that more member states need to be included to get a sufficient number of votes. Consider a scenario in 
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which the member states are divided along the line of their population size and Luxembourg holds the 
Presidency. When big and smaller member states have diametrically opposed interests, Luxembourg 
has to build a larger coalition to pass the voting threshold than would be the case if all big member 
states would have interests similar to the one of Luxembourg.
The power to propose  when (qualified) majority voting applies grants the first-mover disproportionate 
benefits legislative decision-making. The degree to which this holds true is limited in regulatory politics 
by the necessity to include a sufficient majority and the inability to select its member freely. Both 
agenda-setting power and proposal power require the proposer to take the preferences of at least a 
majority into account. However, an agenda-setter can put the stark choice to other members of 
accepting his proposal or being stuck with the status quo. Proposal power, on the other hand, offers the 
possibility of more attractive alternatives in the future which forces the initial proposer to make more 
concessions. The Council Presidency can not preclude alternative proposals from the discussion, but it 
can make the first proposal. Hence it has proposal power, not the stronger agenda-setting power. 
5. The Importance of Flanking Powers for Challengeable Privileges
As has become apparent in the preceding section, the Council Presidency does have a procedural 
advantage in legislative decision-making. However, the formal powers of the Presidency are curtailed. 
Even without an absolute power such as agenda-setting enshrined in the legal text governing the 
decision-making procedure, the Presidency can take on a comparable influence if its proposals would 
never be challenged. The member states do not have an interest to grant this de facto power informally. 
Nevertheless, the Presidency might assume a more powerful role if it had other ways of influencing the 
member states and preventing them from challenging its proposals. ‘Flanking’ powers would enhance 
the value of challengeable procedural privileges by ensuring that challenges do not occur. This 
argument has been made by Cox and McCubbins (1993) with respect to the Speaker of the US House of 
Representatives. It will be instructive to see how the institutional foundations of powers of the Speaker 
compare to the Council Presidency. Both leadership offices can not prevent a vote from taking place 
under all circumstances, their scheduling decision can be bypassed. The Speaker of the House, 
however, enjoys a number of powers that he can use to deter members of the House from trying to act 
contrary to his wishes. In addition, members of the House might find it difficult to override the 
Speaker’s decision because of the transaction costs and collective action dilemma involved. These 
points do not apply to the Council Presidency which hence has to rely on the procedural powers 
regarding the legislative schedule alone when trying to influence legislative outcomes. 
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Gary Cox and Matthew McCubbins (1993: 235) argue that the scheduling power gives the Speaker of 
the House a de facto veto power over legislation. In order to be adopted into law, a proposal has to be 
voted upon. The Speaker of the House decides on the scheduling of votes. By not scheduling a vote for 
a particular bill, he can effectively veto legislation. This implies that only legislation will pass that the 
Speaker prefers to the status quo, otherwise he would refuse to schedule a vote. The decision of the 
Speaker not to schedule a bill for floor consideration and thus preventing it from becoming law can be 
circumvented, however. The Rules of Procedure of the House of  Representatives do not grant the 
Speaker an absolute gate-keeping power, bills can be called up for floor consideration without the 
approval of the Speaker. Thus, the ex ante veto power of the Speaker is challengeable, in particular by 
members of the important Rules Committee. The Speaker, however, has an important say in the 
appointments to the Rules Committee. Through his control of the Rules Committee via the appointment 
process the Speaker has considerable influence on which bill is being advanced to the floor and can 
impede legislation which he opposes, particularly if this conforms to the majority party line. Cox and 
McCubbins  (1993: 238-9) argue that the degree to which this departure from an unchallengeable 
scheduling (and veto) power is relevant depends on the difficulties of organizing an override and the 
potential for retaliation. The higher the transaction costs of organizing a sufficient majority are, the 
stronger is the scheduling power of the Speaker. The floor also needs to overcome a collective action 
problem as the organization of the override represents a public good. Both of these factors are related to 
the absolute size of the majority that is necessary to overturn the Speaker’s decision. The Speaker’s 
scheduling power might also be unchallenged because he holds additional powers (e.g., nomination to 
important committees) that he can use to retaliate against members of a majority overriding his 
schedule (Smith, Roberts et al. 2006: 180-195). The more powers the Speakers enjoys, the more secure 
is his scheduling power.
While the Speaker of the House has considerable additional powers besides his influence on the 
legislative process, the Council Presidency can not grant or withhold prestigious and influential 
positions. The Council members (i.e., ministers of the member states) do not serve at the pleasure of the 
Presidency. The deck is also not heavily stacked in favour of the Presidency in structural terms when 
compared to the Speaker. Sounding out a dozen or so of colleagues on a proposal that probably has 
already been discussed repeatedly in working groups should not present an insurmountable obstacle. If 
there is a sufficient majority in the Council to pass a proposal, then it is very likely that one member 
state will find it to be in its best interest to take on the transaction costs of preparing a vote as a political 
entrepreneur. Hence, unlike the Speaker, the Presidency can not back up its scheduling decisions with 
the threat of retaliation or rely on the inability of member states to override its decisions. This 
comparison carries an important lesson. The Presidency can only exercise its procedural power with 
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regard to the legislative schedule to the extent it has been granted by the other member states. No 
additional powers reinforce the procedural privileges of the Presidency.
6. Conclusion
The Council Presidency has substantial leeway in setting the priorities of legislative work, but only 
limited formal powers which would increase its bargaining power. The Presidency does have a louder 
voice than other member states during its term in office. It can not, however, prevent member states 
from making their positions known and pressing for alternative proposals. 
It is in the interest of member states to grant the Presidency the ability of  steering the legislative agenda 
and that it might have a notable impact on what kind of issues are resolved in the Council. However, the 
member states will seek to curtail the distributional consequences of the office of the Presidency. 
Indeed, the Presidency does not enjoy an absolute power such an unchallengeable veto or a monopoly 
on the making of proposals. Instead it has a prerogative on presenting a proposal. Other member states 
can make alternative proposals. In addition, the time during which a member states enjoys the 
privileges of being at the helm is limited. Furthermore, the Presidency does not enjoy additional powers 
that would back up its procedural privileges. 
This institutional design allows the Council members collectively to benefit from the leadership of the 
Council and the member states holding the Presidency to benefit from the possibility of realizing its 
legislative priorities without blatantly overriding the concerns of other member states. It is not the result 
of a grand bargain, in which member states in turn enjoy extraordinary powers, but represents the 
attempt of the Council to reap the benefits of leadership without allowing its abuses. 
Despite the increased transparency of Council bargaining and recent advances in the scholarship on the 
Council, understanding the effect of the institutional setting and negotiation dynamics inside it is still a 
challenge. Future research will shed more light on how the office of the Presidency, the voting 
threshold, and the division-of-labour interact in shaping legislative decision-making in the Council.  
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M P' P SQM'
Figure 1: The Effect of Institutional Power
P has Outcome
No special power M
Gate-keeping power SQ
Veto power (SQ, P')
Agenda-setting power P
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